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DEVELOPING SECURITIES MARKETS
I. Introduction
Securities markets have become increasingly globalized in
recent years.' Investors, particularly institutional investors, are
diversifying on an international basis and using new techniques for
hedging and arbitrage in international markets.2 The scope for this
diversification is increasing with newly developing securities
markets in countries such as Russia and China. Other countries,
such as Vietnam, hope to develop securities markets to attract
foreign capital, thereby encouraging economic development.
These developments have led to concerns about the differences
in securities laws among various countries. This has resulted in
pressure to harmonize securities laws, or at least to make them
compatible.3  In spite of these concerns there is, at least at a
general level, a substantial degree of similarity in the securities
laws of many countries. It becomes apparent upon a perusal of
securities regulation in different countries that securities laws are
The amount of internationalization is documented extensively. See, e.g., Joseph
A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes
and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349 (1990); Kellye Y. Testy,
Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 927 (1994); Josh Futterman, Note, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era:
Strengthening U.S. Investor Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore
Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 806 (1995); Harvey Lazar et al., Global Competition
and Canadian Federalism: The Financial Sector, 20 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1 (1992)
(summarizing the effects of internationalization on the Canadian securities market).
2 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 361-64.
3 The globalization of securities markets has been a factor in the development of
the International Organization of Securities Organizations (IOSCO). See David Zaring,
International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 283 (1998). The globalization of
securities markets may have been a factor in the harmonization of insider trading laws
through, for instance, the European Insider Trading Directive of 1989. See 1989 O.J. (L
334) 30. It may have also been a factor in the reciprocal recognition of securities laws
such as in the Canadian Securities Administrators National Policy Statement and
corresponding SEC rules in Securities Exchange Act. See Canadian Securities
Administrator National Policy Statement No. 45, National Policy Statements 470-045
(July 1, 1991, amended through Dec. 31, 1993); Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6902, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)T 84,812 (June 21, 1991).
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often copied, at least in form, if not verbatim.4 It also appears that
the copying comes from a limited number of sources.
Why do different countries promulgate similar securities laws?
Why does the copying appear to be from a very limited number of
sources? What influences the source of borrowing? Why do
significant differences in the details remain? Answers to these
questions may inform the strategies to be adopted in formulating
securities laws for newly developing securities markets.
In response to these questions, this Article notes reasons for
the convergence of securities laws and factors that may contribute
to differences in securities regulations. It then considers some of
the implications these factors may have on strategies to be adopted
in formulating securities laws for newly developing securities
markets. Part H briefly notes general similarities of securities laws
in different countries as well as the presence of differences in the
specific details.6 Part I sets out some reasons for the tendency
towards convergence and notes factors that contribute to remaining
differences Part IV discusses some implications for devising
laws in newly developing securities markets."
II. The Convergence of Securities Laws
There is a substantial degree of similarity in the securities laws
of different jurisdictions. Securities laws typically have mandatory
disclosure requirements on the distribution of securities to the
public. 9 They also typically have ongoing mandatory disclosure
requirements to provide information in support of the post-
distribution trading of securities.' ° Insider trading and market
I See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 9-29 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 30-93 and accompanying text.
1 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
I See, e.g., Scott D. Cohen, Comment, Survey of Registration and Disclosure
Requirements in International Securities Markets, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 243
(1988).
10 Such requirements include disclosure of financial statements, proxy circulars,
insider trading reports, and ongoing reporting of significant events concerning the
issuer. See, e.g., MARK R. GILLEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA 147-71 (1992);
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manipulation techniques are usually prohibited in some manner."
Takeover bids are usually subject to rules governing the manner in
which bids are made, the period over which bids must be kept
open, and the information that must be provided to offeree
shareholders."2 Securities market services are usually subject to
record keeping requirements, duties to clients, minimum
competency standards, and minimum capital requirements that are
enforced, in part, through licensing requirements. 3 In many
see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, I TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§§ 9.2-9.3, at 514-24 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing mandatory disclosure requirements in
the United States). In Malaysia, see the Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965, § 165
,(Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996); Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965,
sched. 8 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996). In Singapore, see the
Companies Act, Act 42 of 1967, ch. 50, § 197 (1988 ed., revised ed. 1990); Companies
Act, Act 42 of 1967, ch. 50, sched. 8 (1988 ed., revised ed. 1990). In the case of Japan,
see, e.g., Ken Tsunematsu & Shuji Yanase, Japan, in 3(2) INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION I, at 50-58 (Robert C. Rosen ed., 1997).
" See, e.g., Helen Lee, An International Perspective on Market Manipulation, in
THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS 201, 201-04 (1992); see also,
e.g., Mary J. Houle, Comment, Survey of National Legislation Regulating Insider
Trading, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 209 (1988) (surveying insider trading
regulations in various countries).
"2 See, e.g., GILLEN, supra note 10, at 312-21; 2 HAZEN, supra note 10, §§ 11.10
and 11.14, at 266-73, 290-99. In Japan, see the Securities and Exchange Law, Law No.
25 of 1948, art. 27-2 to 27-12 (as amended through Apr. 1, 1995) (in Tsunematsu &
Yanase, supra note 10, 48-58) and the Japanese Takeover Ordinance. In Singapore, see
the Companies Act, Act 42 of 1967, ch. 50, §§ 213 and 214 (1988 ed., revised ed.
1990); Companies Act, Act 42 of 1967, sched. 10 (1988 ed., revised ed. 1990); Code on
Take-Overs and Mergers. In Malaysia, see the Securities Commission Act, Act 498 of
1993, § 33-33E (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996). Both the
Malaysian and Singaporean Codes on Take-Overs are virtually identical to the London
City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers. The Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, which
administers the London City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, was created in 1968 by
the London Stock Exchange, the Bank of England, and other British financial
institutions "to deal with perceived abuses in corporate takeovers." Deborah A. DeMott,
Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 71 (1987).
Although the broad thrusts of these takeover regulations are similar, there are, of course,
considerable variations in detail. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
"3 See, e.g., GILLEN, supra note 10, at 368-90; 2 HAZEN, supra note 10, §§ 10.2,
10.2.2-10.2.3, 10.6-10.7, at 10-27, 33-47, 91-102. See generally Malaysian Securities
Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996)
(promulgating security market services regulations); Singaporean Securities Industry
Act, Act 15 of 1986, ch. 289 (1986) (concerning the licensing of dealers, advisors and
fund managers, while subjecting licensees to requirements such as record keeping and
minimum capital requirements).
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countries, there has also been a gradual shift towards a greater
degree of public regulation. 4
14 In the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, securities trading, at one
time, was largely regulated by stock exchanges against the backdrop of the common law
of contract. See, e.g., ARTHUR P. POLEY & F.H. CARRUTHERS GOULD, THE HISTORY,
LAW, AND PRACTICE OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE (1907); RUDOLPH E. MELSHEIMER &
WALTER LAURENCE, THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE (1879)
(discussing the law relating to stock exchanges). Stock exchanges and trading in
company shares existed in the United States and Canada long before the adoption of
specific securities laws. There is evidence of organized securities trading in the United
States as early as 1792. See FRANCIS L. EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 13-
17 (1968). In addition, there was the so-called "curb market" in New York City where
securities could be traded at least as early as the 1870s, and which served as the
precursor to the American Stock Exchange. See ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1921-1971 xiii-xxi, 1-21 (1972). The first statute
directly regulating securities sales in the United States was a Kansas statute, adopted in
1911. See 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 133. The first major federal statutes to regulate
securities sales in the United States were the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange was first established in
1852 "as an association of businessmen who met in each other's office for
approximately one half-hour each day to exchange holdings of securities." G.V.
SAWIAK, THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE FOR COMPANIES AND
THEIR PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS 1 (1986). The exchange was incorporated in 1878. See
id. The first Canadian statute directly regulating the sale of securities was the Manitoba
Sale of Shares Act of 1912, which was modeled on the Kansas statute. See Sale of
Shares Act, ch. 75, 1912 M. Gaz. (Can.). Stock exchanges regulated securities issuers
through listing agreements and regulated brokers through membership rules. See, e.g.,
R.H. CODE HOLLAND & JOHN N. WERRY, POLEY'S LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE STOCK
EXCHANGE 38-58, 89-113, 135-43, 153-56, 345-53, 409-18 (1932). Issuers agreed to
requirements for the quotation of securities. See id. at 419-23. Brokers complied with
membership rules for the right to execute trades through the exchange. See id. at 343-
53.
Although early forms of regulation made use of administrators, they did not
require the same types of administrative agencies that have been promulgated by modem
securities legislation. For instance, instead of creating a securities commission or
agency, the Manitoba Sale of Shares Act required a license for the sale of shares from
the Public Utility Commission. See Sale of Shares Act, ch. 75, § 2, 1912 M. Gaz.
(Can.). The first securities commission in Canada was created in Ontario in 1945 under
the Ontario Securities Act, ch. 22, 1945 S.O. (Can.). In the United States, the federal
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) came into existence with the passage of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (West 1998).
While securities trading has been going on in Malaysia and Singapore since
around the turn of the century, see TAN PHENG THENG, SECURITIES REGULATION IN
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA: A PRIMER ON THE LAWS OF THE STOCK MARKET WITH CASES
AND MATERIALS 1-3 (1978), Malaysia has only very recently created a securities
commission, see Securities Commission Act, Act 498 of 1993, § 3 (Golden's Federal
Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996) and Singapore has yet to do so. Until the creation of
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In many cases there are more than just similarities in the
securities laws. Often securities regulations are clearly borrowed.
For example, aspects of Malaysian and Singaporean securities
laws dealing with both disclosure and continuous disclosure
requirements were borrowed from the Australian uniform
companies acts,"- which were similar in many respects to the
a securities commission in Malaysia, such matters as the vetting of prospectuses and
administrative decisions with respect to takeovers were handled by a Capital Issues
Committee (See the Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983, §§ 5-6 (Golden's Federal
Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996), prior to their repeal by the Securities Commission
Act, Act 498 of 1993, § 45 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996) and a
Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers (See the Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965, § 179
(Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996), prior to its repeal by the Securities
Commission Act, Act 498 of 1993, § 45 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of Malaysia)
1996)) which were both part of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. See the Rules of
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange prior to the enactment of the Securities Commission Act
of 1993.
15 See H.A.J. FORD, PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY LAW 15 (4th ed. 1986). The
Australian uniform companies acts, containing virtually identical provisions, were
enacted in 1961 and 1962. See New South Wales Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No.
71, §§ 37-47, §§ 76-89 (Austl.); Victoria Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 6839,
§§ 37-47, §§ 76-89 (Austl.); South Australia Companies Act, 1962, No. 56, §§ 37-47,
§§ 76-89 (Austl.); Queensland Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 55, §§ 37-47,
§§ 76-89 (Austl.); Western Australia Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 82, §§ 37-
47, §§ 76-89 (Austl.); Tasmania Companies Act, 1962, No. 66, §§ 37-47, §§ 76-89
(Austl.).
For example, the provision dealing with civil liability for misrepresentations in a
prospectus in the Western Australia Companies Act (and in the identically worded
provisions in the other Australian companies acts cited above) is as follows:
Subject to this section, each of the following persons is liable to pay compensation
to all persons who subscribe for or purchase any shares or debentures on the faith
of a prospectus for any loss or damage sustained by reason of any untrue statement
therein, or by reason of the wilful non-disclosure therein of any matter of which he
had knowledge and which he knew to be material, that is to say every person who-
(a) is a director of the corporation at the time of the issue of the prospectus;
(b) authorised or caused himself to be named and is named in the prospectus as a
director or as having agreed to become a director either immediately or after an
interval of time;
(c) is a promoter of the corporation; or
(d) authorised or caused the issue of the prospectus.
Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 82, § 46(1) (Austl.). The corresponding provision
in the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 reads:
Subject to this section, each of the following persons shall be liable to pay
compensation to all persons who subscribe for or purchase any shares or debentures
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
United Kingdom's Companies Act 1948.16 The Malaysian
Securities Industry Act 1983'" and the Singapore Securities
on the faith of a prospectus for any loss or damage sustained by reason of any
untrue statement therein, or by reason of the wilful non-disclosure therein of any
matter of which he had knowledge and which he knew to be material, that is to say
every person who-
(a) is a director of the corporation at the time of the issue of the prospectus;
(b) authorized or caused himself to be named and is named in the prospectus as a
director or as having agreed to become a director either immediately or after an
interval of time;
(c) is a promoter of the corporation; or
(d) authorized or caused the issue of the prospectus.
Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965, § 46(1) (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of
Malaysia) 1996); see also the Singaporean Companies Act, Act 42 of 1967, ch. 50,
§ 55(1) (1988 ed., revised ed. 1990) (containing a civil liability provision for
misrepresentations in a prospectus which is a copy of the corresponding provision in the
Malaysian statute).
16 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38 (Eng.); see generally FORD, supra note 15, at 13-
15 (discussing the history of the Australian company laws). Compare Companies Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 37-46 (Eng.), with Western Australia Companies Act,
1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 82, §§ 37-47 (Austl.), and Tasmania Companies Act, 1962, No.
66, §§ 37-47. The provisions are generally similar. The provision on civil liability for
misrepresentations in a prospectus is based on the U.K. Directors' Liability Act, 1890,
53 & 54 Vict., ch. 64 (Eng.), which, in the 1948 U.K. Companies Act, reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this section, where a prospectus invites persons to
subscribe for shares in or debentures of a company, the following persons shall be
liable to pay compensation to all persons who subscribe for any shares or
debentures on the faith of the prospectus for the loss or damage they may have
sustained by reason of any untrue statement included therein, that is to say-
(a) every person who is a director of the company at the time of the issue of the
prospectus;
(b) every person who has authorised himself to be named and is named in the
prospectus as a director or as having agreed to become a director either
immediately or after an interval of time;
(c) every person being a promoter of the company; and
(d) every person who has authorised the issue of the prospectus: ....
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 43(1) (Eng.). Compare this with the
corresponding provisions in the Companies Act, 1961, 10 Eliz. 2, No. 82, § 46(1)
(Austl.) and the Malaysian Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965, § 46(1) (Golden's Federal
Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996). Also, compare these provisions to Section 11 of the
U.S. Securities Act of 1933 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (West 1998)).
17 Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of
Malaysia) 1996).
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Industry Act'8 are also very similar to corresponding Australian
laws. 9 The takeover bid provisions in Malaysia and Singapore are
based primarily on the London City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers." In addition, Rule lOb-5 in the United States has been
copied in both Singapore and Malaysia.'
'8 Securities Industry Act, Act 15 of 1986, ch. 289 (1986).
'9 Compare Malaysian Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983 (Golden's Federal
Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996), and Singaporean Securities Industry Act, Act 15 of
1986, ch. 289 (1986), with New South Wales Securities Industry Act, 1975, No. 3
(Austl.), and Commonwealth Corporations Act, 1989, No. 109, ch. 7 (Eng.). Certain
amendments to Australian securities industry acts have been adopted in subsequent
amendments to Singaporean and Malaysian securities industry acts. See, e.g., Khaw
Lake Tee, The Securities Industry Act 1983, 11 J. MALAYS. COMP. L. 93 (1984).
Singaporean legislation on the regulation of the securities industry and market
manipulation was developed at the same time similar legislation was being developed in
Australia. Discussions were held between Singapore and Australian state authorities
who were facing similar concerns about their respective securities markets. Singapore
delayed passage of its legislation in order to coordinate its introduction with almost
identically worded Malaysian legislation. See TAN PHENG THENG, supra note 14, at 31-
33. Although the general thrust of these securities acts was similar to that of the U.S.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the approach in Singapore and Malaysia at the time
was to avoid the creation of a commission similar to the SEC and to rely more heavily
on a self-regulatory approach to the securities industry. See id.
20 See DeMott, supra note 12.
21 U.S. Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240 (West 1998).
The corresponding provisions in the Malaysian Securities Industry Act provide that:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly in connection with the
purchase or sale of any securities -
(a) to use any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(b) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or
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Japan is another example of borrowed securities laws. The
occupation forces in Japan permitted the reopening of Japanese
stock exchanges after World War II when Japan adopted securities
laws modeled on the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.22 Japanese securities laws include an
insider short-swing profit rule similar to that contained in § 16 of
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,23 and an anti-fraud rule
which is clearly based on U.S. Rule lOb-5. 4
(c) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
Malaysian Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983, § 87A (Golden's Federal Statutes
(Laws of Malaysia) 1996); see also Singaporean Securities Industry Act, Act 15 of
1986, ch. 289, § 102 (1986) (promulgating a similar restriction on fraudulent transfers of
securities).
22 See Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation
Law Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 179, 181.
23 The Japanese Securities and Exchange Law provides that:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of secret information of a listed
corporation, etc. which may have been obtained by an officer or principal
shareholder of such corporation by reason of his office or position in the
corporation, if such person realizes any profit by a purchase within six months after
sale, or sale within six months after purchase, on his own account, of specified
securities, etc. of the corporation, the corporation may required him to tender such
profit to the corporation.
Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 164 (as amended through Apr.
1, 1995) (in Tsunematsu & Yanase, supra note 10, 138). Section 16(b) of the U.S.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in
good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (West 1998); see also Lu, supra note 22, at 185 (discussing how the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 served as a model for corresponding Japanese
legislation).
24 The Japanese Securities and Exchange Law states that:
No person shall commit any act set forth in the following Items:
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In spite of similarities between the securities laws of different
countries, differences of varying degrees of significance remain.
For instance, although a prospectus requirement and other forms of
mandatory disclosure are common, the specific information that
must be disclosed varies in terms of the type, quantity, and form. 5
In many countries, the regulation of insider trading is a much more
recent phenomenon than it has been in other countries.26 In some
(1) To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to buying,
selling or other transactions of securities or with respect to securities index futures
tradings, etc., securities options tradings, etc. or foreign market securities futures
tradings, etc.;
(2) To obtain money or other property by using documents or any other
representation which contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading with
respect to buying, selling or other transactions of securities or with respect to
securities index futures tradings, etc., securities options tradings, etc. or foreign
market securities futures tradings, etc.; and
(3) To make use of any false quotation for the purpose of soliciting buying,
selling or other transactions of securities or securities index futures tradings, etc.,
securities options tradings, etc. or foreign market securities futures tradings, etc.
Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 157 (as amended through Apr.
1, 1995) (in Tsunematsu & Yanase, supra note 10, at 134). Compare this to U.S. Rule
lOb-5. See supra note 21. Although Japan has formally borrowed Rule 1Ob-5, its
application in Japan has been different from its use in the United States. For instance,
though Rule lOb-5 has been used widely in insider trading cases in the United States, it
has never been used in an insider trading case in Japan. See Lu, supra note 22, at 185-
86; Winifred Swan, The 1988 Japanese Insider Trading Amendments: Will Japan See
Results From These Tougher Laws?, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 275, 276-77 (1991).
25 Compare R.R.O. Reg. 1015 (1990), amended by 0. Reg. 638, 1993, § 1 (Can.)
(containing Ontario Form 12 in the area of prospectuses for industrial issuers), with 17
C.F.R. § 239.11 (West 1998) (describing Form S-1). Compare R.R.O. Reg. 1015,
(1990), amended by 0. Reg. 638, 1993, § I (Can.), and 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, with
Malaysian Companies Act, Act 125 of 1965, sched. 5 (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws
of Malaysia) 1996), and Singaporean Companies Act, Act 42 of 1967, ch. 50, sched. 5
(1988 ed., revised ed. 1990).
26 A European Community directive in 1989 led to the introduction of insider
trading laws in several European countries. See 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. In Germany, this
type of legislation was not adopted until 1994. See Georg F. Thoma & Jonathan S.
Berck, Germany, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN 79 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1992) (discussing insider trading in Germany prior to
1994); see also Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL
INSIDER DEALING 129 (Mark Stamp &- Carson Welsh eds., 1996) (concerning the
regulation of insider trading after 1994).
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countries, short selling is prohibited, while in others it is allowed.27
Takeover bid rules, while similar in many respects, have
significant variations in takeover bid periods, withdrawal right
periods, and the kind of information that must be disclosed.28
While similar techniques are typically used to regulate securities
market participants, the specific requirements can vary
considerably.29
27 See Malaysian Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983, § 41 (Golden's Federal
Statutes (Laws of Malaysia) 1996 (as amended Mar. 19, 1998). This section has its
origins in very similarly worded provisions of the Australian uniform securities acts
(New South Wales Securities Industry Act, 1975, No. 3, § 54 (Austl.); Victoria
Securities Industry Act, 1975, No. 8788, § 54 (Austl.); Queensland Securities Industry
Act, 1975, No. 78, § 54; Western Australia Securities Industry Act, 1975, No. 99, § 54
(Austl.)), which were carried forward into the uniform federal Corporations Act. See
Corporations Act, 1989, Act 109, § 846 (Austl.). An early version of a short selling
provision appeared in the Queensland Securities Industry Act of 1971, although that
section only required that the seller disclose to the dealer that he or she had no currently
exercisable interest in a security that he or she proposed to sell. See Queensland
Securities Industry Act, 1971, No. 2, § 41 (Austl.). Curiously, Singapore has no short
selling restriction even though the Singapore Securities Industry Act was drafted in
conjunction with and drew extensively from Australian securities industry acts.
Section 41(1) of the Malaysian Securities Industry Act provides:
Subject to this section and any regulations that may be made, a person shall not sell
securities unless, at the time when he sells them-
(a) he has or, where he is selling as agent, his principal has; or
(b) he believes on reasonable grounds that he has, or where he is selling as agent,
his principal has,
a presently exercisable and unconditional right to vest the securities in a purchaser
of the securities.
Securities Industry Act, Act 280 of 1983, § 41(1) (Golden's Federal Statutes (Laws of
Malaysia) 1996) (as amended Mar. 19, 1998). Section 846(1) of the Australian federal
Corporations Act reads as follows:
Subject to this section and the regulations, a person shall not sell eligible securities
to a buyer unless, at the time of the sale:
(a) the person has or, where the person is selling as agent, the person's principal
has; or
(b) the person believes on reasonable grounds that the person has, or where the
person is selling as agent, the person's principal has;
a presently exercisable and unconditional right to vest the securities in the buyer.
Corporations Act, 1989, Act 109, § 846(1) (Austl.).
28 See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 12, at 84-116.
29 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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III. Reasons for Similarities and Differences in Securities
Laws
This Part notes various reasons for similarities in securities
laws and factors contributing to differences in securities laws.
Subpart A notes reasons for similarities while subpart B highlights
factors contributing to those differences.
A. Why Are There Similarities in Securities Laws?
There may be many reasons for similarities in securities laws.
Perhaps the laws move towards similar solutions because these are
the only practical solutions. Perhaps similar interest groups arise
in securities markets wherever they develop, resulting in political
pressures that lead to similar laws. The similarities may be the
result of competitive pressures associated with attracting
investment capital. Such competition may have become more
pronounced because of the increasing internationalization of
securities markets. ° Other factors that may cause securities laws
to converge are pressures from American regulators to have U.S.
style securities laws adopted in other countries, the geographical
proximity of countries, the sharing of a common language, or close
business or educational contacts. The important roles played by
particular persons in the development of securities laws may also
be a factor. Similarities in securities laws could also develop
because of simple coincidences that lead to the following of one
country's laws over those of another. These factors are briefly
noted below.
1. Convergence Towards Optimal Solutions
Securities laws may have a tendency to converge because
securities markets develop similar problems for which there are
optimal solutions towards which markets gravitate. Each
jurisdiction thus works its way to these optimal solutions as their
securities markets develop. While the details of the laws may
differ from one jurisdiction to another, the broad thrust of the laws
will be similar. For instance, mandatory disclosure may be the
30 See supra note I (noting the amount of internationalization and the effects
therefrom).
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best solution to problems of asymmetrical information and
potential frauds on the public distribution of securities,3 or it may
provide a more comparable standard of disclosure that might not
be produced in the private market.
32
Such inevitable solutions are, at best, only part of an
explanation for the similarities in securities laws. First, doubt has
been expressed as to whether the solutions securities laws typically
provide are in the public interest. For instance, it has been
suggested that the costs of mandatory disclosure may outweigh the
benefits,33 and the evidence on the effect of mandatory disclosure
suggests that it brought little, if any, benefit. 4 The benefit of
regulating insider trading or takeover bids has also been
questioned.35 There is empirical evidence suggesting that takeover
bids that result in net gains in wealth are not wholly due to pure
wealth transfers,36 and that takeover bid regulation deters these
31 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
32 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 707-14 (1984).
34 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.
L. 117 (1964); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the
Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981); Carol J. Simon, The
Effects of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New
Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1989); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the
Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON.
REV. 132 (1973) (discussing tests of the effects of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
35 See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547
(1970); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L.
Rev. 1 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Alan
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229
(1986) (regarding takeover bid regulation).
36 This has generally been the conclusion of reviews of the considerable empirical
literature on the effects of takeovers. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for
Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2(1) J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 54-
58, 66 (1988); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and
Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 122-55 (1992) (finding evidence in support of value
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socially beneficial takeovers.37
Second, there are conceivable alternatives to the types of
securities laws that are most prevalent. The concern for
asymmetrical information and potential frauds, for instance, has
been addressed in a variety of ways at different times. Initially,
there was very little of what one would recognize as modern day
securities regulation.38 Markets and implicit market forces served
to limit the extent of the problem.39 The early response in England
was to expand the scope of civil sanctions for misrepresentations
by issuers.40 Another approach has been to provide a mechanism
to facilitate the investigation of frauds backed up by civil,
administrative or penal sanctions.4n Yet another approach has been
to require the disclosure of certain information to a private or
public administrative body that will assess the merits of
investment in the securities and will only allow the distribution if
investment in the securities met some minimum quality standard.42
maximizing explanations for takeovers and only weak evidence of non-value
maximizing explanations of takeovers that cannot fully account for the overall gains
from takeovers); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: the Scientific Evidence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5, 23-27 (1983).
" See Jarrell, supra note 36, at 53-54; Romano, supra note 36, at 155-60; Jensen
& Ruback, supra note 36, at 28-29; see also, e.g., Fischel, supra note 35; Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 35; Schwartz, supra note 35 (arguing that takeover bid regulation
does in fact deter beneficial takeovers).
38 See supra note 14 (noting that the trading of securities pre-dated by many years
the development of modern-day securities regulation).
39 Reliance on market forces to deal with problems of assymetrical information
may be a reasonable approach given the evidence on the effectiveness of mandatory
disclosure and arguments on the cost of mandatory disclosure relative to its benefits.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (presenting a cost benefit analysis of
mandatory disclosure). Reliance on market forces may also be a reasonable approach to
insider trading and takeover bid regulation given the doubts that have been raised with
respect to the benefits of insider trading regulation and takeover bid regulation. See
supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (noting the presence of empirical evidence
suggesting that takeover bid regulation may not be beneficial).
40 See, e.g., Directors' Liability Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 64 (Eng.).
4l See, e.g., The Securities Fraud Prevention Act, ch. 34, 1928 S.O. (Can.).
42 This was the approach of early state "blue sky" legislation in the United States,
first enacted in the state of Kansas. See 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 133. This legislation was
later adopted in several states and in other jurisdictions. For a review of the
development of state blue sky laws, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin
of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEx. L. REV. 347 (1991); see also the Sale of Shares Act, ch.
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Some scholars argue that many aspects of securities regulation
served the particular rent-seeking interests of various participants
in securities markets" or responded to the bureaucratic pressures
present in securities regulatory organizations. 44 In responding to
such interests and pressures, various aspects of securities
regulation may not, in fact, be consistent with the broader public
interest.
Thus, while similarities in securities regulation can be
explained, in part, as a gradual movement towards optimal
solutions to common problems, other factors may also play an
important role in the convergence of securities laws. Given the
plausible alternatives to the most prevalent types of securities
laws, it's not clear that the most common types of securities
regulations are optimal. Further, securities laws arguably serve
interests other than a broad public interest.
2. Political Pressures Leading to Similar Securities Laws
An alternative explanation for the convergence of securities
laws is that similar political pressures may exist in different
75, 1912 M. Gaz. (Can.) (promulgating a blue sky law in the province of Manitoba).
" On public choice theories, see, e.g., SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER,
THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981) (arguing that the securities laws in the United
States amount to a substantial subsidy to securities analysts and institutional investors);
Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities
Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION, at 21 (Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds.,
1974) (arguing that securities regulation in the United States worked to the advantage of
larger issuers of securities by imposing much more substantial burdens on smaller
issuers than on larger issuers); Macey & Miller, supra note 42 (arguing that smaller local
banks, local industries, and farmers lobbied for state blue sky regulation at the expense
of large Wall Street banks, investment banking firms, and major issuers of securities in
manufacturing, railroad, and public utility companies); David D. Haddock & Jonathan
R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to
Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987) (arguing the interests of
professional traders and insiders coalesced to bring about the particular pattern of insider
trading regulation).
4" See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice,
Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
527 (1990) (arguing that goals of individuals in the SEC influence its institutional
behavior and create a tendency towards complex and arcane regulation); Nicholas
Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119
(1981) (noting the influences on SEC staff that encourage a continuing expansion of
federal securities regulation).
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countries where securities markets develop.45  First, similar
political pressures may arise in different jurisdictions quite
independently of competitive pressures that evolve in securities
markets due to international competition. Second, competition for
capital in international securities markets may also affect the shape
of domestic securities laws. Third, foreign interests may attempt
to influence domestic securities laws to protect economic rents in
existing markets against competition and to secure similar
economic rents in the host jurisdiction.
(a) Similarities in Developing Securities Markets
Leading to Similar Political Pressures
Similar political pressures may arise due to common features
in the development of securities markets that lead to similar
interest groups applying political pressure in search of economic
rents.
(i) Similar Securities Market Participants
Forms of organization involving multiple investors are likely
to develop in response to economic pressures to capture economies
of scale by producing on a large scale or otherwise to engage in
enterprises that require very large capital outlays. The benefits of
liquidity tend to encourage forms of investment that can be freely
traded.46  An industry with expertise in the trading of these
investments is likely to develop. Consequently, many different
countries are likely to end up with securities markets that have
broadly similar structural characteristics. There will be promoters,
investors, brokers, dealers, underwriters, portfolio managers, and
investment advisers. To manage risk, capture the benefits of
41 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing public choice theories
of securities regulation). These explanations of securities regulation might apply in
other countries if similar political pressures exist in those countries.
46 On the benefits of limited liability in the form of increased liquidity, see, e.g.,
Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30
U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
Liability in the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).
17 Stories of the development of stock exchanges and other markets are often quite
similar. See, e.g., FERNAND BRAUDEL, 2 CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH
CENTURY: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 97-114 (1982).
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diversification, and connect providers of funds with users of funds,
various forms of financial intermediation will likely develop.48
Exchanges are likely to be formed as brokers find that they can
increase their business by facilitating trading through an
exchange. 49  Accountants, who become involved as issuers of
securities, attempt to signal the quality of their investments to
investors by calling upon other accountants to put their
reputational capital at stake in lending their seals of approval to the
issuer's financial statements. ° Other experts may be called upon
in a similar fashion to put their reputations at stake in approving
the claims made by issuers of securities." Lawyers will become
involved both in developing the contractual framework within
which securities trading takes place and in the process of settling
the legal disputes that frequent securities trades are bound to
create.
(ii) Common Investor Protection Interests
These various market participants may have a common interest
in protecting investors. Investor protection that increases the
expected values of securities encourages capital formation through
the issuance of securities, thereby increasing business for
48 See, e.g., H.H. BINHAMMER, MONEY, BANKING AND THE CANADIAN FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 99-103 (5th ed. 1988) (describing the services that financial intermediaries
provide); TAN CHWEE HUAT, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS IN SINGAPORE 23-
170 (7th ed. 1992) (describing financial institutions in Singapore that provide financial
intermediation services).
49 Stock exchanges often developed when brokers met in a given place and
inquired whether their fellow brokers had clients interested in buying what their clients
were interested in selling. See BRAUDEL, supra note 47, at 99. See generally, TAN
PHENG THENG, supra note 14, at 1-4 (describing the development of the Singapore and
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchanges).
" See, e.g., Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing,
and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1983); Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 33, at 687-89 (regarding the use of accountants as a signal of
accuracy of financial statements).
5 These other experts might include ratings organizations, engineers, geologists,
or lawyers rendering legal opinions. For a discussion on the use of "informational
intermediaries," see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 603-05 (1984).
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promoters, underwriters, accountants, and lawyers. 2  The
increased capitalization of the market tends to prompt more
trading and thus more business for brokers and exchanges.
Increased investment and trading is also likely to lead to more
business for portfolio managers and investment advisers.
Participants in securities markets at the time of an expansion in
investment through investor protection will gain temporary
economic rents until a competitive response restores normal
profits 53
The various market participants can use market mechanisms to
address problems of asymmetric information that cause investors
52 Suppose investors require a return of 10% per annum on an investment of a
given risk. Suppose that there is a project of the given risk requiring $1,000,000 of
capital, and which will yield $110,000 of profit per annum (or 11%). At a 10% required
rate of return, this project seems worthwhile. However, if investors are concerned that
the facts upon which the potential returns are based may be the result of a fraud or
misrepresentation, they may adjust their estimate of the potential returns accordingly. If
they adjust their expectations of the returns down to $90,000 per annum, the project will
not be worthwhile to investors, and project promoters will not proceed with it. Investors
are expecting only $90,000 on an investment of $1,000,000, or a 9% return, which is
less than the required 10%. If one were to sell shares on such a project, and the market
was reasonably efficient, the most one could expect to raise (no matter what the number
of shares sold) would be $900,000.
If investors were more confident that the facts on which the $110,000 per annum
return was based were accurate, they would be willing to pay up to $1,100,000 on the
financial instruments sold to raise the required capital investment funds. The project
promoters would be able to proceed with the project. In other words, if investor
confidence in the accuracy of information concerning investment projects could be
increased through investor protection, then more investment projects would proceed
with more securities being sold to raise the capital thus creating more business for
securities industry participants.
53 Economic rent has been described as follows,
The amount that a factor must earn in its present use to prevent it from moving
(i.e., transferring) to another use is called its transfer earnings. Any excess it
earns over this amount is called its economic rent.
RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 336 (6th ed. 1988). Normal profits are "the
imputed returns to capital and risk taking just necessary to prevent the owners from
withdrawing from the industry." Id. at 180.
In other words, normal profits are the profits that are just enough to keep
persons in an industry from pursuing other ventures that would yield approximately the
same profits. Economic rent accrues when the resources used in the business earn more
than the amount that is just sufficient to prevent the owners of those resources from
transferring them to other uses.
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to discount the value of securities.54 Indeed, various participants in
securities markets may have come into existence largely to address
these concerns. For instance, as noted above, issuers of securities
may engage underwriters, accountants, and other experts in an
attempt to provide a signal to investors of the quality of their
securities." By subjecting issuers to various requirements in
exchange for listing privileges, securities exchanges can also
protect investors with the result that listings on exchanges come to
serve as signals of the investment quality of securities listed on
them." There may, however, be limitations to these market
mechanisms. The general reluctance of societies to allow private
parties to impose punitive sanctions limits the capacity of markets
to enforce mechanisms designed to reduce asymmetric
information." Thus, market participants may seek the assistance
of public forms of enforcement.
Public enforcement may also serve a common investor
protection interest in providing a more comparable standard of
54 There is an asymmetry in information in that issuers of securities have more
information about the value of their securities than investors have. Investors and issuers
can attempt to reduce the asymmetry. Issuers can try to provide investors with
information, and investors can try to gather and assess information. However, these
activities involve costs. At some point, the cost of further reductions in the asymmetry
in information will outweigh the benefits. Investors will be left with a residual inability
to distinguish between better quality and poorer quality securities. They will adjust for
the uncertain quality by an across the board discount in the prices of securities. This
will tend to drive the higher quality securities out of the market. The seminal paper on
this "adverse selection" process is George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons':
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970). For an
application of this process to securities markets, see, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 33, 673-74.
" See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 689-90; FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
294-95 (1991).
57 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 300-03 (1991).
58 Imprisonment of individuals under private agreements is generally not allowed,
and courts are reluctant to enforce liquidated damages provisions in private agreements
that are punitive in nature. See, e.g., S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 301-08
(3d ed. 1993); G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 898-902 (9th ed., Sweet &
Maxwell 1995); SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 776, at
667-79 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed., Baker, Voorhis 1961).
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disclosure than one produced in the private market. 9 Investors,
issuers and persons in the securities business may benefit from the
development of a standard form for the presentation of
information. However, an individual issuer, because she could not
capture the benefits that other issuers would derive from their
adoption of a standard form of disclosure, may not have an
incentive to adopt a standard form of disclosure to its optimal
extent. This might be addressed through a mechanism, such as
membership in a stock exchange, which would require compliance
with a standard disclosure format. Limits on allowable methods of
private enforcement, however, may justify some public
involvement in this area.
(iii) Anti-Investor Protection Rent Seeking
Activities
The various participants are also likely to promote regulation
that provide them with economic rents.6° However, this may not
be conducive to maximizing the values of securities. 6' For
instance, securities industry participants may seek regulation that
controls entry into their particular businesses. Licensing regimes
for various types of market participants, such as brokers,
underwriters, portfolio managers, and investment advisers, might,
in part, be interpreted as attempts to control entry into these
businesses. It has been suggested that mandatory disclosure gives
larger issuers a competitive advantage over smaller issuers because
the costs of compliance with disclosure requirements are, to a
large extent, fixed.62 Thus, the costs of compliance for larger
issuers would be a smaller percentage of the value of their
" See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 686-87.
60 See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 43, at 21-24; supra note 43 (citing articles
that contend securities regulation has arisen as a result of rent-seeking activities by
securities participants or as a consequence of bureaucratic pressures within regulatory
organizations).
61 See id.; supra notes 33-37 (outlining the costs and benefits of both mandatory
disclosure and takeover bids).
62 See Manne, supra note 43, at 28-36; PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 43, at 46-
49, 114.
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outstanding securities than would be the case for smaller issuers.63
It has also been suggested that financial analysts benefit from
having information gathered and formatted under mandatory
disclosure laws,64 while underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and
other experts gain from their involvement in complying with
mandatory disclosure laws without corresponding benefits to
investors.65
Other interests that are less directly involved in securities
markets, but instead offer competing modes of raising capital, may
also play an important role in the regulation of securities markets.
For instance, it has been argued that state banks, which stood to
lose loan business from an increased use of stocks and bonds in
capital formation, were a significant source of pressure for the
adoption of so-called "blue sky laws" in the United States. These
blue sky laws required a regulatory review of the investment
merits of securities before they could be sold.66
(iv) Summary
Different countries, in adopting securities laws, may be
subjected to the same kinds of political pressures because each
developing securities market will have broadly similar groups
participating in it and will have similar forms of competing
interests shaping it. Since similar political pressures affect the
securities markets of different countries, laws taking broadly
similar approaches to the regulation of securities markets may
occur quite independently. The securities regulation that results
from these political pressures may or may not be in the public
interest.
(b) Competition for Capital and the
Internationalization of Securities Markets
While different countries may independently develop quite
63 See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 43, at 46-49, 114.
64 See id. at 22-23, 37, 44, 51.
65 See id. at 44, 114.
66 See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 42 (reviewing development of state
"blue sky" laws).
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similar political pressures leading to the adoption of similar
securities laws, there are also pressures in the international context
that have probably contributed to a trend toward similarity in
securities laws. International competition for capital is a potential
source of political pressure that has probably increased in recent
years with the globalization of securities markets.
(i) Securities Laws and the Competition for
Capital
Capital directed to investment promotes economic growth and
development.6' The capital necessary for investment can come
from either of two sources: channeling the savings of. the
country's residents into investment or encouraging foreign
investment. Countries compete for the scarce funds of investors in
the international marketplace. Funds tend to move to the country
that is perceived to provide the best return on investment for a
given level of non-diversifiable risk.68  This places pressure on
policymakers, with the influence of local entrepreneurs, to provide
conditions that will encourage investment by both residents and
foreigners by maximizing return on investment and minimizing
non-diversifiable risk.
A country's legal infrastructure is among the factors that affect
the country's investment climate. 69 A country's securities laws are
part of that legal infrastructure. This provides an incentive for
countries to gravitate towards securities laws that appear most
67 Investment is necessary for economic growth. See, e.g., LIPSEY ET AL., supra
note 53, at 828. The resulting capital formation can result in increases in labor
productivity. See, e.g., ROBERT V. CHERNEFF, MACROECONOMICS 332, 336-38 (1993).
68 Risk and return are the two essential elements of assessing the value of an
investment. An efficient portfolio of investments consists of investments that produce
the greatest return for a given level of risk. See, e.g., J. FRED WESTON & THOMAS E.
COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 357-92 (9th ed. 1992) (discussing the effect of risk
and return on investment decisions).
69 See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries Poor?: The Role
of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
DEVELOPMENT, at 15, 40-44 (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997). On the importance of
a legal infrastructure to economic prosperity, see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 54-60 (1990).
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inclined to attract investment. °
(ii) Increasing International Competition
With the significant trend toward the "globalization" of
securities markets in recent years," issuers of securities frequently
float issues in countries other than their home countries,72 and
investors invest increasing amounts in foreign markets.73 This
trend has been encouraged by numerous factors. For instance,
advances in communications technology and the development of
computer technology in the processing of transactions facilitates
the trading of securities and the settlement of securities
transactions in remote markets.74 Developments in finance theory
70 This is similar to the argument that competition in corporate chartering would
cause different jurisdictions to gravitate to similar corporate laws in what might be
called a "race to the bottom" (the seminal article for which is William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974))
or a "race to the top" (the seminal article for which is Ralph K. Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977)). For a general discussion of corporate chartering competition, see, e.g.,
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-51 (1993). Similar
arguments have been made with respect to securities regulation. See, e.g.,
EASTER3ROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 56, at 295-96, 300-02.
71 See supra note I (noting the amount of internationalization in recent years).
72 North American issuers have sought increasing amounts of capital overseas. For
instance, in the first nine months of 1986, private issuers in the United States offered
U.S.$35.1 billion in debt securities in the Eurobond market. See Leslie Wayne, Finance
Officers' Wider Role, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at DI. International bond issues by
U.S. issuers expanded from U.S.$40 billion in 1980 to over U.S.$250 billion in 1989,
and international equity issues by U.S. issuers increased from almost nothing in 1984 to
over U.S.$18 billion in 1987. See Futterman, supra note 1, at 806 n.2. In Canada, the
sales of new issues of securities to non-residents increased from Can.$6.5 billion in 1978
to Can.$22.3 billion in 1989. See Lazar et al., supra note 1, at 5.
73 For instance, in Canada, sales of outstanding issues to non-residents grew from
Can.$2.6 billion in 1978 to Can.$107.9 billion in 1989, and purchases of outstanding
issues from non-residents grew from Can.$3.0 billion in 1978 to Can.$95.4 billion in
1989. See Lazar et al., supra note 1, at 5. United States investors acquired and sold a
record high U.S.$270.9 billion of foreign equities in global markets in 1992, with total
equity holdings by U.S. investors at U.S.$210 billion in 1993. See Testy, supra note 1,
at 930. In the first half of 1993, U.S. investors bought U.S.$27.3 billion of foreign
bonds compared to U.S.$21.9 billion for all of 1990. See id.
74 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Macintosh, International Securities Regulation: Of
Competition, Cooperation, Convergence, and Cartelization 2 (Oct. 20-21, 1995) (paper
presented at the Consumer and Commercial Law Workshop).
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favor increased international portfolio diversification." Such
developments also favor the introduction of new types of
securities, such as derivative securities, which can be used to
achieve the benefits of international diversification while
circumventing local restrictions on foreign ownership with smaller
levels of investment.7 ' The growth of institutional investment
increases the number of investors that spread the information and
transaction costs of international diversification across a large
dollar value portfolio.77 Deregulation in areas such as foreign
exchange controls and reduced restrictions on participation by
investors in foreign securities markets also serve to facilitate the
internationalization of securities markets.7 1
This internationalization of securities markets increases the
availability of funds from foreign investors, and facilitates the
flight of funds from local markets.79  This tends to increase
competition between countries for investment funds. Such
increased competition for investment funds tends to place
additional pressure on countries to adopt securities laws that are
perceived to be the most likely to attract investment funds.
Securities law developments in the United States and Canada
provide evidence consistent with this competition for investment
funds and securities business. The potential flight of funds and
securities business from the United States and Canada to other less
heavily regulated jurisdictions was a significant factor in the
development of shelf registration, Regulation S, and Rule 144A in
the United States, ° and the development in Canada of prompt and
71 See id. at 3.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 3-4.
78 See id. at 4.
71 See supra notes 72-73 (noting increased international competition).
80 See MacIntosh, supra note 74, at 17; Futterman, supra note I, at 806-07.
Regulation S protects U.S. issuer securities offerings or resales of such securities outside
the territorial boundaries of the United States. See Testy, supra note 1, at 937-55;
Futterman, supra note 1, at 807-08, 825-40; 1 HAZEN, supra note 10, § 4.28.1, 308-13; 3
HAZEN, supra note 10, § 14.2, at 72-73. Rule 144A authorizes unlimited resales of
securities which haven't been registered under the Securities Act of 1933 as long as such
sales are made to a particular group of large institutional investors. See 1 HAZEN, supra
note 10, § 4.26.1, at 301-03; 3 HAZEN, supra note 10, § 14.2, 74-75.
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shelf offerings81 and the multijurisdictional disclosure system.82
(c) Foreign Interests Protecting Economic Rents from
International Competition
The development of a country's securities laws may also be
affected by political pressure from a foreign country that has well-
developed securities markets and securities regulations. The
securities laws in the foreign country may provide market
participants in that country with economic rents that could be lost
in the face of foreign competition. It may then behoove the
foreign country's market participants to exert political pressure for
the adoption of similar securities regulations in other developing
securities markets so that the economic rents they earn in the
domestic market are not subject to dilution through competition.
In the context of the internationalization of securities markets,
such political pressure may also be brought to bear in order to
secure similar economic rents for operations carried on in
developing securities markets.
In recent years, there has been diplomatic pressure from the
81 In the Canadian context, see Robert Steen & Ross McKee, The Prompt Offering
Qualification System at 1626, 1628-30 (Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin, Mar.
21, 1986). Prompt offerings in Canada allow for a quicker vetting of prospectuses by
securities commissions by reducing the prospectus to information primarily on the rights
associated with the particular securities being offered and having other information
about the issuer incorporated by reference from continuous disclosure documents. See
GILLEN, supra note 10, at 223-32. Shelf offerings allow an issuer to pre-clear the
issuance of securities of a particular type over an ensuing two-year period. The issuer
can then issue securities of that type virtually instantaneously over the two-year period
without having to wait while Canadian securities commissions clear a prospectus for the
particular issue. See id. at 232-41.
82 See the Canadian Securities Administrators National Policy Statement No. 45,
National Policy Statements 470-045 (July 1, 1991, amended through Dec. 31, 1993).
For the corresponding U.S. provisions, see the Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6902 [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812 (June 21, 1991). These
provisions allow, in some situations, distributions of securities in Canada on the basis of
compliance with U.S. disclosure laws, while also allowing distributions of securities in
the United States on the basis of compliance with Canadian disclosure laws. It also
permits takeover bids involving shareholders in the United States and Canada to
proceed, in certain circumstances, on the basis of compliance with Canadian takeover
bid requirements or, in certain circumstances, on the basis of compliance with U.S.
takeover bid requirements. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 10, § 14.2, at 73-74; GILLEN, supra
note 10, at 111-12.
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United States to obtain assistance in the enforcement of U.S.
securities laws and to encourage other countries to adopt securities
regulations similar to those in the United States. This is perhaps
most notable with respect to insider trading." These diplomatic
endeavors may be the result of political pressure brought to bear in
the United States by those who earn economic rents brought about
by U.S. securities laws.84 The concern is that these rents will be
dissipated with the flight of funds from the United States to
countries with securities laws that impose fewer restraints on
securities transactions.
The desire to protect economic rents obtained through
American securities regulation may also account for the pressure
to give U.S. securities laws an increasingly extraterritorial effect.85
Following U.S. style securities laws may be a straightforward step
for a country if American securities laws are effectively being
applied there in any case. Enacting U.S. style securities
regulations may, in part, be a means of protecting some degree of
sovereignty in enforcement. The desire to protect economic rents
from foreign competition may also be a factor in U.S. attempts to
obtain a greater degree of harmonization of securities laws through
the International Organization of Securities Organizations
(IOSCO).86
83 See, e.g., Gregory R. Raifman, The Effect of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss
Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 16 SEC. L. REV. 423 (1984); Mark S. Klock, A
Comparative Analysis of Recent Accords Which Facilitate Transnational SEC
Investigations of Insider Trading, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 243 (1987); John J. Ryan
IV, International Enforcement of Insider Trading: The Grand Jury Process, Court
Compulsion and the United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 247 (1988); Gerald A. Polcari, A Comparative Analysis
of Insider Trading Laws: The United States, the United Kingdom and Japan-The
Current International Agreements on Securities Regulation, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 167 (1989).
84 For instance, a possible explanation for U.S. efforts to secure treaties dealing
with insider trading is that this is a response to political pressure from members of the
securities industry in the United States to protect economic rents, which they obtain
through insider trading laws, from being dissipated by competition from foreign
securities markets. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 43 (discussing the potential
economic rents to securities industry participants from the regulation of insider trading).
85 See, e.g., 3 HAZEN, supra note 10, § 14.2, at 59-75.
86 On the increasing U.S. influence in IOSCO, see MacIntosh, supra note 74, at
25-26; U.S. SEC Forges New Global Role Within IOSCO; Breeden Chairs Strengthened
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3. Transaction Costs, Information Costs, Uncertainty,
and the Source of Borrowing
As noted above, not only do securities laws tend to converge
but there is also evidence that jurisdictions borrow substantial
elements of securities laws from one another. While political
pressures in both the domestic and international context may lead
to a convergence of securities regulations, they do not explain this
tendency to borrow securities laws. They also do not explain why
countries generally borrow from a very limited set of existing
securities laws.
(a) Why Borrow?
(i) Avoids Cost of Political Compromise
One could start from scratch by creating securities laws that
respond to political pressures from local interest groups.
However, this involves a potentially prolonged process of political
compromise while various interest groups lobby for their particular
interests. Instead, foreign laws might be invoked in the political
dialogue, in part as a form of rhetoric and, in part as a starting
point representing a compromise between similar interest groups
in the foreign country. With the foreign compromise as a starting
point, much of the prolonged process of political compromise
might be avoided. This might then be modified by variations on
the foreign laws that accommodate differences in the structure of
local interest groups.
(ii) Uncertainty Discourages Experimentation
Another reason for borrowing laws may be the uncertain effect
of creating unique laws. Borrowing allows one to get some sense
of the effect the laws will have by looking to the effects of those
laws in other jurisdictions. It may be nearly impossible to predict
the effect of a newly created, unique set of laws, and the
consequent uncertainty will tend to discourage the adoption of
approaches that radically differ from those in other countries. This
Technical Committee, 3(24) INT'L SEC. REG. REP. 1 (1990); U.S. SEC Would Cut
Futures Group From JOSCO Working Party Structure, 3(16) INT'L. SEC. REG. REP. I
(1990).
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uncertainty, in the face of international competition for investment,
is likely to be an important factor in the context of securities laws.
Even if a country were to accept the uncertainty associated
with the effect of a radically different approach to securities laws,
it would face the added costs of communicating the unique
approach to investors and overcoming the uncertainty investors
would have as to the effect of any radically different approach.
Borrowed securities laws can reduce the costs of overcoming
investor uncertainty where the borrowed laws are ones with which
investors are already familiar or have developed a level of comfort
from their dealings with them.
(b) Information Costs and the Number of Sources of
Borrowing
In its approach to borrowing securities laws, a country could
consider all of the existing securities laws in other jurisdictions.
However, this is likely to be inordinately costly. While the costs
of gathering securities laws, translating them into the local
language, and even comparing them at some general level might
be manageable, it would nonetheless be virtually impossible and
exceedingly costly to assess the likely effect of the different
securities laws if they were adopted. Thus, such a comprehensive
approach can not realistically be undertaken. A choice must be
made regarding which laws to consider.
(c) Factors Affecting the Source of Borrowing
The process of deciding which jurisdiction should be the
source for a country's securities laws may be affected by several
factors. These factors can be related to information costs involved
in choosing the source of borrowing. They tend to encourage a
relatively narrow focus in terms of the potential sources for a new
securities market's regulations. The factors include such things as
how well known and apparently successful a particular set of
foreign securities laws is, educational links, language, the extent of
inter-country commercial links, and possibly, the extent of parallel
legal structures in the borrowing and source countries.
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(i) Uncertainty and the First-Mover Advantage
Uncertainty over the effect of different securities laws and the
difficulty of overcoming investor uncertainty toward radically
different securities regulations tend to discourage fundamental
deviations from an existing set of securities laws. As a result of
this uncertainty, countries focus on the set of securities laws that
are widely known and perceived, correctly or incorrectly, to be
most closely linked to success in attracting investment or earning
economic rents for influential market participants. Adopting such
laws reduces the uncertainty associated with unique securities laws
and avoids the costly and virtually impossible task of attempting to
assess the effects of a variety of other possible approaches while
adopting what ex ante appear to be the laws most likely to achieve
the desired effect. It is also likely to reduce the cost of
communicating to investors the nature and likely effect of the laws
by allowing one to simply point to the existing securities laws of a
country with which investors are likely to have some familiarity.
The success of the country that is the source of the securities laws
is also likely to be an effective form of rhetoric for market
participants who seek economic rents similar to those enjoyed by
their counterparts in the source country. A country that is the first
to develop an apparently successful set of securities laws can, thus,
have a considerable edge in being the source country of choice,
given the likely reluctance of countries to experiment with
different approaches to securities laws.
The U.S. securities laws of the 1930s appear to fit the role of
such a first-mover. Other countries adopting securities laws,
daunted by the empirical task of assessing the effects of a wide
variety of possible securities regulations, may have had a tendency
to look to U.S. laws, noting the success of the U.S. economy.
Also, the United States is an important source of investors.
American investors may be generally familiar with U.S. securities
laws and have some confidence in the protection they provide.
They are likely to be more inclined to invest in countries having
similar securities laws. Thus, this may be another important factor
in the tendency to follow the approach of U.S. securities laws.87
87 Some evidence of this tendency to follow the approach of U.S. securities laws is
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(ii) Educational Links
A country's choice for its source jurisdiction may also be
affected by the educational backgrounds of the country's lawyers
and policymakers. When searching for a starting point to draft
laws in their own jurisdictions, lawyers may rely on the laws of
those countries where they received their basic legal training or
pursued graduate studies in law. There can be other advantages
from having securities laws with which lawyers may be familiar
from their earlier studies. In particular, lawyers should be more
readily able to assimilate such securities laws, thereby lowering the
cost of legal services associated with compliance.
Certain countries may occupy a leading position in education,
resulting, to some extent, in a convergence of ideas. The United
States and the United Kingdom arguably occupy such leading
positions and this may account, in part, for the relative dominance
of U.S. or U.K. securities laws in several countries.
(iii) Language
Closely related to the effects of educational links is the effect
of sharing a common language. There may be a tendency to copy
the laws of a country whose securities laws can be more readily
ascertained because they are set out in a language that is
understood in the country borrowing the securities laws. Sharing a
common language may also affect the way people think about
securities law issues.
As with education, one or more languages tend to dominate in
the international setting. For instance, English has arguably taken
a dominant position in the world.88 This may contribute to a
discussed in supra notes 21-24, dealing with the copying of certain features of U.S.
securities laws in Malaysia, Singapore, and especially Japan.
88 In terms of the language persons speak as their native tongue, English ranks
fourth (with Mandarin, Hindi, and Spanish ranking first, second, and third respectively).
See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 642-43 (1997). However, English is spoken
by between 700 million and 1 billion persons as a native, second, or foreign language.
English is used in over 60 countries as an official or semi-official language. It is
prominent in another 20 countries and is either dominant or well-established on six
continents. See ALASTAIR PENNYCOCK, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF ENGLISH AS AN
INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE 7-8 (1994). By 1980, two-thirds or more of the world's
scientists were writing in English, and 80% of the world's electronically stored
information was in English. See 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS
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convergence of ideas that are linked to the way problems are
conceived of in English. The dominance of English may also
facilitate the adoption of securities laws from other English-
speaking countries, such as the United States or the United
Kingdom. Many countries have a group of persons who are
sufficiently conversant in English to read the securities laws of
English speaking jurisdictions, making the laws of these
jurisdictions more accessible than those of other jurisdictions."
(iv) Extent of Commercial Links
Close commercial links, whether due to the proximity of
countries or otherwise, may also encourage countries to adopt
similar securities laws. Close mercantile ties, particularly when
they involve capital flows between countries, may bring political
pressure from securities industry participants and investors to
make the securities laws of different countries compatible.
Compatibility can reduce the transaction costs associated with
raising capital and thus increase the amount of capital that is likely
to be raised. The compatibility of Canadian and U.S. securities
laws, joint U.S.-Canadian interjurisdictional policy releases, and
memoranda of understanding on securities law matters are good
examples of attempts to achieve compatibility when there are
significant commercial links between the countries.90
(v) Common Legal Tradition
The similarity between the securities laws of Singapore and
§ 2, at 1121 (1994).
89 The securities laws of other jurisdictions are also becoming more readily
available in English. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION (Robert C.
Rosen ed., 1998); INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: PACIFIC RIM (Gordon R.
Walker ed., 1996). Some securities law related provisions can also be found in DIGEST
OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (Lester Nelson ed., 1998). Some translations are
available from securities regulatory authorities or private law firms. For instance, the
author has an English translation of the Securities and Exchange Act of Thailand
prepared by both the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Chandler
& Thong-ek Law Offices Limited. This availability of securities laws in English from
non-English speaking countries may facilitate borrowing from other jurisdictions.
However, U.S. and U.K. securities laws are likely to continue to dominate due to the
effects of the various other factors mentioned in the text.
90 See supra note 82.
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Malaysia-and their borrowing from Australian and British
securities laws-suggests that policymakers may have a tendency
to look to jurisdictions with similar legal systems and traditions. 9
It may be easier for policymakers to understand and assess the
likely effects of the laws of jurisdictions with similar legal
traditions, thus lowering the information costs associated with
such assessments. It may also be easier to incorporate the laws of
such jurisdictions into the domestic legal system, thereby lowering
the costs of implementing borrowed laws. Thus, common law
jurisdictions may tend to follow other common law jurisdictions,
and civil law jurisdictions may tend to follow other civil law
jurisdictions.
(vi) The Roles of Particular Individuals and the
Element of Chance
In the process of developing a set of laws that responds to
political pressures, it may make sense to assign tasks to a
particular individual or a small group of individuals. This avoids
transaction costs for coordinating an unwieldy network of interest
group representatives and for reaching a joint position on a wide
array of issues. Instead, the individual or small group can work to
a solution that, while not representing the optimal solution for each
participant, is one for which no interest group is willing to incur
the costs involved in defeating it. There may be several solutions
that meet such a criterion. Consequently the individual, or small
group of individuals, may have a significant influence on the
choice of a solution. The background of the persons involved may
then be of some significance in the source of and extent of
borrowing. For instance, where the person worked or did graduate
studies may be significant in her choice of a source jurisdiction,
since the person may feel she is in a better position to understand
and communicate the impact of the source country's laws.
An element of chance may be involved in choosing individuals
to lead the development of a particular set of laws. There may be a
limited set of persons having credible expertise for such positions.
91 See supra notes 15-20 (noting similarities in Malaysian, Singaporean,
Australian, and British securities laws).
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The choice among this limited set may be based, in part, on chance
connections between the person making the appointment and the
appointee. The person or group of persons may have become
influential in the development of securities laws through a series
of coincidences involving contacts or friendships fostered
professionally, during school years, or through chance meetings.
Personal characteristics of the appointee may also influence the
choice of the person making the appointment.
B. Factors Contributing to Differences
Though the securities laws of different countries contain
similarities, differences of varying degrees of significance remain.
It is implicit in the previous analysis concerning information and
transaction costs that there may still be room for some degree of
experimentation by individual countries. Experimentation may
take the form of creating uniquely local laws, adopting variations
on borrowed laws, and promulgating laws that consist of unique
forms of multi-source borrowing. In addition, several factors may
affect the kinds of political pressures brought to bear in a country,
leading to different political pressures being placed on different
countries. As a result, the securities laws of various jurisdictions
may contain different features because divergent pressures affected
the political processes of these countries differently. In the context
of securities laws, these factors include the stage of a country's
development, differences in legal systems, ideology, culture, local
market conditions, and path dependence. These are canvassed
below as possible explanations for observed differences in
securities laws.
1. Experimentation
Some differences in securities laws may result from
experimentation when policymakers take note of perceived
deficiencies in the securities laws of other countries and seek to
correct them with their own home-grown approach. There is still
variation given uncertainty over the set of laws that will best
attract investment. Thus, there may be continuous
experimentation in an attempt to identify the set of laws that best
attracts investment. The securities laws may also be complicated
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by attempts to achieve other policy goals through the regulation of
securities markets.
2. Stage of Development
The stage of development may contribute to differences in the
securities laws. When adopting their regulations, countries with
more recent securities markets will not have the same experience
to draw upon as those countries with older securities markets.
Consequently, their laws may be less finely nuanced with, perhaps,
less regulatory detail.92
The borrowing of securities laws can, to some extent,
overcome a country's lack of experience with securities markets
by drawing on the experiences of other countries. However, a lack
of securities market expertise for the effective enforcement of
securities regulations may also be a factor that limits the regulatory
complexity of securities laws. Because of strong pressures to
provide higher standards of living and because of demands from
entrepreneurs and foreign investors, developing countries may be
less inclined to place regulatory hurdles on the sale of securities
that provide the necessary funds for investment to promote
development.
Further, less developed securities markets may have yet to
develop the same institutional structures as more developed
securities markets. Thus, the kinds of political pressures brought
to bear during the creation of securities laws in developing markets
may not be the same as those in more developed securities
markets. Divergent political pressures, therefore, can lead
countries to promulgate securities laws with contrasting features.
3. Legal System Differences
The existence of contrasting legal systems may be another
source for the differences in securities laws. As noted above, it
may be easier to implement and assess the effect of securities laws
92 It has been suggested that securities commissions, once in place, have a
tendency to increase steadily in the amount of regulatory detail. See Wolfson, supra
note 44, at 124-27; Langevoort, supra note 44, at 531-32. Thus, more recently
developed regulatory frameworks are less likely to have developed the same degree of
regulatory detail.
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that are drawn from a country having a similar legal system.
If common law countries borrow primarily from other common
law countries while civil law countries borrow from other civil law
countries, then one might expect to find at least two securities law
models with different approaches attributable to the different
characteristics of the competing legal systems. The fact, however,
that securities regulation in common law countries has become
predominantly a matter of statutory law, administered largely by
regulatory bodies, tends to reduce the significance of the
distinction between the civil law and common law approaches.
4. Ideology
Ideology may also play a role in some differences in securities
laws. For instance, the development of securities laws in
transitional economies, such as China and Vietnam, may be
affected by a continuing controlled economy mentality in the
minds of influential bureaucrats. Securities laws might, thus, be
drafted with the intent to constrain securities trading or to direct
securities markets towards achieving a particular economic
outcome. For instance, trading in the securities of companies in
specific industries that the government wants to promote might be
encouraged over trading in securities of companies in other
industries. A controlled economy mentality might also emphasize
government access to information, at least as much or more so
than investor access to information, since information is a key
component to effective control over an economy. More generally,
where a Marxist ideology has prevailed, there may be a skepticism
towards the adoption of capitalist concepts, particularly those
associated with such a central component of capitalism as the
trading of securities.
Countries which are in a process of transition from command
economies are also likely to have a pre-existing set of political
pressures that differ from those present in a country with a market
based economy. The groups in a command economy that stand to
gain or lose economic rents from the development of securities
markets and related securities laws are likely to be different from
the groups that might gain or lose economic rents in the
development of securities markets and securities laws in a
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primarily market based economy.
5. Culture
Differences in culture or religion also have an effect on
securities laws. Such differences may be reflected in different
ethics toward business relations, while also impinging upon such
matters as good faith in securities trading or in provisions for
securities market services. These differences in culture or religion
may result in differences in the political pressures brought to bear
in the context of the development of securities laws.
6. Local Market Features
While securities markets tend to develop similar structures
with similar participants, there may also be features unique to local
securities markets. These unique features may create different
problems that call for unique regulatory responses. Unique
regulatory responses may also be due to slightly different interest
group pressures created by the unique features of local securities
markets.
7. Path Dependency
The development of securities markets, while taking on similar
overall characteristics, may, in some respects, have proceeded
down different paths. As noted above, subtle variations in the
development of, securities markets, resulting in different interest
group pressures, might lead to variations in securities laws. Once
particular interest groups have something to lose through changes
in securities laws, it may be difficult to closely follow the laws of
another country. In short, once the securities laws have proceeded
down one path, it may be difficult to follow the path taken by
another country because the change will be resisted by those who
believe they would suffer substantial losses as a result of the
change.93
" The concept of path dependence has been described in the following way:
The strength of the concept of path dependence... is in its analytic power in
explaining outcomes where strategic actors are deliberately searching for
departures from long-established routines and attempting to restructure the rules
of the game. Actors who seek to move in new directions find that their choices
1998]
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IV. Implications for Securities Laws in Developing Securities
Markets
The factors contributing to similarities and differences in
securities laws considered in the' discussion above have
implications for the introduction of securities laws in developing
securities markets.
A. Good Reasons for Borrowing Securities Laws
As suggested in Part fIf, there are several possible reasons for
the borrowing of securities laws. Many of these reasons suggest it
may be a good idea for a country with developing securities
markets to borrow securities laws. Borrowing may be preferable
to wholesale experimentation because the solutions of securities
laws in other countries may have come, over time, to approximate
optimal solutions.
Borrowing can also reduce information costs to investors
associated with learning and assessing the effects of unique and
untested securities laws, thereby reducing the level of residual
uncertainty. Borrowing may also provide an initial approximation
to a political compromise among developing market participants
so as to avoid some of the costs associated with reaching a
political compromise.
B. Consider Use of a Widely Known Set of Securities Laws
A country with developing securities markets should also
consider using a widely known set of securities laws since this
reduces information costs to investors associated with learning and
assessing the effects of the country's securities laws, thereby
are constrained by the existing set of institutional resources. Institutions limit
the field of action; they preclude some directions; they constrain certain
courses. But institutions also favor the perception and selection of some
strategies over others. Actors who seek to introduce change require resources
to overcome obstacles to change. This exploitation of existing institutionalized
resources is a principal component of the apparent paradox that even (and
especially) instances of transformation are marked by path dependence.
David Stark, Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe, in
COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN THE NEW GLOBAL
ORDER 169-70 (A. Douglas Kincaid & Alejandro Portes eds., 1994); see also NORTH,
supra note 69, at 92-100 (discussing path dependence).
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minimizing residual uncertainty.
C. Limit the Number of Sets of Securities Laws Considered
Limiting the number of countries whose securities laws are
considered also reduces the costs of assessing the potential
different effects of the securities laws.
D. Educational Links Should be Considered
Educational links provide developing countries with ready
sources of lawyers who can draft securities regulations. They also
present developing countries with the added benefit of borrowing
securities laws from those countries where a number of their
lawyers received their legal training. Lawyers should be more
readily able to assimilate such securities laws, thereby lowering the
cost of legal services associated with compliance.
E. Commercial Links Should be Considered
Commercial links should also be considered since a country
with which one has important commercial links may be a
significant source of potential investors. Borrowing that country's
securities laws would reduce, for these foreign investors, the
information costs associated with learning and assessing the
effects of the securities laws. Significant commercial links may
also be a factor in the cost of legal services since lawyers in both
countries will tend to have some familiarity with the securities
laws of the country with the more developed securities markets.
F. Potential Significance of the Legal System
Before borrowing securities laws, a country should consider
the legal systems of the possible source jurisdictions. Borrowing
securities laws from a country with a significantly different legal
system runs the risk of unintended inconsistencies with existing
local laws and unintended gaps in the securities regulatory
regime.94
14 In common law countries, the development of a body of common law through
court decisions in substantive areas, such as contracts and torts, provides a backdrop
against which securities laws in those countries are drafted. In these countries, securities
statutes and regulations may not deal with certain issues because they are dealt with by
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Misconceptions in the application of such laws by enforcement
personnel or local lawyers may lead to an application of the laws
that is quite different from that of the source country. This could
result in uncertainty and confusion among investors, diminishing
the benefits of reduced information costs and uncertainty that
borrowing might have otherwise provided.
G. Potential Significance of a Common Language
In a similar vein, borrowing securities laws from a country
with a common language may be worth considering. It may not be
easy to find persons with both expertise in translation and
expertise in securities markets and securities laws. The possible
result is confusion in the translation of the laws, creating confusion
among investors, persons charged with the enforcement of the
laws, and those involved in providing assistance in compliance.
H. Some Deviations from the Borrowing Source Should be
Considered
While there may be several advantages to borrowing securities
laws, there may also be good reasons for some variations from the
source country's laws. As noted in Part III, securities laws may, at
least in part, be the result of inefficient rent-seeking activities. A
country with developing securities markets, having as yet
relatively less developed securities market participants, may be in
a unique position to avoid such inefficient rent-seeking behavior.
Unique features of the country's markets may provide
opportunities to create a securities market niche. Exploiting these
opportunities may be facilitated by some deviations from the
securities laws of the source country. As the markets become
more established and investors become more comfortable with the
administration of the country's securities laws, the risk of some
experimentation will be reduced. Thus, initially, a country with
developing securities markets should avoid significant deviations
from its source country's securities laws. However, it may be
possible to increase the degree of deviation as the markets
develop.
the common law. Similarly, in civil law countries, securities statutes or directives may
leave some matters to be dealt with under existing civil or commercial codes.
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DEVELOPING SECURITIES MARKETS
L Other Considerations
1. Allowing Entry of Foreign Securities Market
Participants
If a country with developing securities markets borrows the
notion of licensing securities market participants, as most
countries do, then it should also consider facilitating the licensing
of foreign market participants. A number of securities market
participants, such as accountants, engineers, underwriters, and
rating organizations, provide important signals to investors. They
can signal the credibility of information disclosed by issuers of
securities and can condense complex sets of information into
simpler bits of information. The credibility of these signals often
depends on the reputation of the particular market participants, a
reputation which can take a long time to develop. Market
participants with sufficiently strong reputations are not likely to
exist in developing securities markets. Securities market
participants from countries with more developed securities
markets will need to fill the gap, at least in the early stages of the
development of a securities market. Otherwise it will be difficult
for issuers to signal the credibility of their information disclosures
to investors.
2. Providing for Independent, Non-Corrupt Enforcement
by Trained Personnel
Benefits from borrowing securities laws in terms of reduced
information costs and uncertainty may be severely restricted by an
inconsistent enforcement of the laws. Ad hoc decisions, especially
ones that favor particular individuals or institutions to the
disadvantage of others, will create uncertainty for investors. Such
decisions would make it more difficult and costly to give advice
on the law and to comply with it. Thus, steps should be taken to
ensure that the persons charged with enforcement, while
accountable to political bodies, are independent of them in the
enforcement of securities laws. The potential for corruption
should be contained. This can be achieved through such
mechanisms as having enforcement personnel disclose their assets
and other interests and subjecting them to a range of sanctions,
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such as disciplinary actions-including dismissal-and penal
sanctions.
The benefits of reduced information costs and uncertainty are
more likely to be derived if the enforcement of the borrowed
securities laws is consistent with that of the source country. Thus,
to reap the benefits of borrowing, the borrowing country should
consider having individuals trained in the source country or, in the
interim, borrow enforcement staff from the source country.
